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1. Introduction 
 
In his theory of search unemployment Pissarides (1990) links the essentials of his 
theory to the neo-classical production function and the neo-classical growth model. In 
this paper we link Pissarides’ theory to the monopolistic competition model of Dixit 
and Stiglitz (1977).  
Many economists believe that fixed costs and product differentiation are very 
attractive features of the latter model, which have made it a useful tool in new trade, 
growth theory, macroeconomics and regional economics. In particular, in economic 
policy debates the number and size of firms is often related to the unemployment 
issue. However, the number and size of firms are not determined in models using the 
neo-classical production function and search unemployment does not appear in the 
Dixit-Stiglitz model. As many economists argue the search theory of unemployment 
has received much empirical support. It seems to be a worthwhile effort to link 
Pissarides’ theory to the monopolistic competition model, thus joining two of the 
workhorse models in economic theory. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 1 summarizes literature on imperfect competition and non-monetary 
theories of unemployment, which comes closest to our contribution. The first column 
lists models of the Dixit-Stiglitz type. Unemployment in this column is based on 
pessimistic expectations in Weitzman (1985) and Dutt and Sen (1997). In Weinrich 
(1993), using the Blachard and Kiyotaki (1987) variant of the Dixit-Stiglitz model, 
unemployment is based on the use of an effort function that is continuous in wages 
and unemployment. In Matusz (1996, 1998) it is based on the Shapiro-Stiglitz model 
of efficiency wages. In deGroot and van Schaik (1998, 2000) dual labour markets 
with unemployment arise because of an efficiency wage relation.  In de Groot (2001) 
dual labour markets arise because of union bargaining. The last model mentioned in 
the first column of the table is the focus of this paper.  
In the second column, models with other forms of monopolistic competition 
than that of Dixit-Stiglitz are listed. Weitzman (1982) uses a Hotelling model and 
unemployment is based on pessimistic expectations of the self-fulfilling prophecy 
type. Bräuninger (2000) considers unemployment based on bargaining. Bargaining is 
about profits and rents from being employed. Unlike the Pissarides model there are no 
hiring costs creating rents for firms but rather – unlike the Dixit-Stiglitz model - 
profits are positive because the model has a large, exogenous number of firms and no 
fixed costs. There have been other attempts to relate search unemployment and 
monopolistic competition in the literature. One group of attempts is related to the 
Aghion and Howitt (1994, 1998 chap.4) quality ladders approach. In that approach the 
number of firms is given because there is vertical product differentiation. We use the 
Dixit-Stiglitz approach of horizontal differentiation because it has an endogenous 
number of firms. Bean and Pissarides (1993) adjust the Pissarides (1990) model to an 
overlapping-generations growth model by fixing the employment duration to last one 
period. Bean and Pissarides then go to analyse the effect of savings shocks on 
employment and growth; this topic is not considered here. In their model firms play 
Cournot in each differentiated product. Table 1 indicates which gap in the literature 
this paper fills.  
  In this paper, we investigate to what degree the comparative static results of 
Pissarides (1990) and Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) are unchanged and which results on the   2 
number of firms can be added. We limit our comparison with the literature to that of 
other static models. Results from literature that uses either a different theory of 
unemployment or a different model of monopolistic competition can be compared 
with our results more straightforwardly.  
Matusz (1998) has linked the Dixit-Stiglitz model to efficiency-wage 
unemployment of the Shapiro-Stiglitz type. In the non-shirking constraint the number 
of varieties appears. Therefore country size or international trade increasing the 
market size yielding more variety relaxes the non-shirking constraint. By implication 
the unemployment needed to deter shirking is lower. In Matusz (1996) an increase in 
market size increases productivity because of an increased number of intermediate 
products, which allows for higher wages and less equilibrium unemployment again 
via a non-shirking constraint. In this paper we find no market size effects of 
international trade on the unemployment percentage rate for several reasons. First, 
with differentiated consumer goods in our model the productivity effect of Matusz 
(1996) is absent in our set up. Second, having no non-shirking constraint in the 
Pissarides part of our model, variety cannot have such a prominent role in relation to 
unemployment as it has in Matusz (1998). Other channels, from market size to the 
rate of unemployment, - discussed verbally by Matusz (1996)
i - are also not modelled 
here because there is hardly any empirical indication that they are relevant. 
Unlike Dutt and Sen (1997) we do not find that increased bargaining power of 
unions increases demand and therefore employment. The reason is that our model, 
unlike the Weitzman (1985) type of model used by Dutt and Sen, is not demand 
constrained and allows for real-wage flexibility and entry. 
Weitzman (1982) has emphasised the negative relation between (expected) 
unemployment and real wages stemming from a move up the average cost curve when 
unemployment gets higher. Our model also allows for this relation, but also for the 
opposite one depending on what type of exogenous shocks cause the move. If the 
shock comes from interest or separation rates there is a negative relation. If, however, 
the shock comes from unemployment benefits and bargaining power then there is a 
positive relationship.        
Vogt (1996) has criticised monopolistic competition models because of their 
property to translate wage increases completely into price increases (see Weitzman 
(1985), Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), Matusz (1996, 1998)). He circumvents this 
point by developing a model of potential competition. A different way of avoiding 
this is to introduce theories of unemployment into those of monopolistic competition. 
In this paper, the problem is avoided by introducing search unemployment into a 
model of monopolistic competition. Wage increases can either increase prices or 
decrease hiring costs as in Pissarides (1990).  
Our model has higher employment under monopolistic than under perfect 
competition as in Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) where a real balance effect with 
endogenous labour supply causes this result. 
Other results are presented as propositions below and summarised in section 5. 
Which of the results are better – ours, or those in the literature - is an empirical 
question that goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
2.  The model
ii 
 
Trade in the labour market 
    3 
From the Pissarides (1990) model we use the matching function m L = m(uL, vL ), 
where L is the total number of employed and unemployed workers, u is the 
unemployment rate, v is the rate of vacancies and mL is the number of matches 
produced by this function. The function is assumed to be increasing in both 
arguments, concave and linearly homogenous.
iii Defining labour market tightness as q 
º v/u, division of the matching function by vL yields q(q)= m(u/v,1) as the probability 
of a firm to find a worker for a vacancy and qq(q) = m/u = m(1, v/u) as the probability 
of an unemployed worker to find a job. A shock is a percentage rate s at which (1-u)L 
employed workers loose their job by assumption in every period. Therefore s(1-u)L 
workers go from a job into unemployment every period. On the other hand qq(q)uL 
unemployed workers expect to find a job each period. A labour market steady state 
equilibrium is defined as a situation where the numbers of workers going into and out 
of unemployment are equal and expectations turn out to be true, i.e. s(1-u)L= 
qq(q)uL.  Solving this equation for u yields the Beveridge or UV curve (lower indices 
referring to variables indicate partial derivatives): 
 








u s      (1) 
 
Multiplying equation (1) by q yields an equation for the vacancy rate because 
X XYX Y: 
 








v s       (1’) 
 
Equation (1) and (1’) are drawn in the lower right quadrant of figure1. 
 
Government or unemployment insurance  
 
The government is assumed to pay unemployment benefits z to each unemployed 
worker. The financing of this is not explicitly treated in Pissarides (1990). We show 
how this can be modelled to keep Pissarides’ results intact. Total expenditures of the 
government or unemployment insurance for unemployment benefits are zuL. It will 
turn out that the incentives are ultimately unchanged if both the employed and the 
unemployed pay a tax or insurance premium t to finance the unemployment benefits. 
Revenue then is tL. From the balanced budget assumption we make it follows that tL 
= zuL and therefore t = zu. Workers therefore receive w-t = w – zu and unemployed 
benefits are z - t = z – zu. As z is considered to be a policy variable, the budget 
equation determines the value of t, whereas u is determined in the general equilibrium 
part of the model below.   
 
Households and workers 
 
The present value, discounted at rate r, of the expected income stream of an 
unemployed and an employed worker, U and E respectively, are: U = [z - zu + 
qq(q)(E-U)]/r and E=[w + s(U-E)]/r. E-U is the income difference an unemployed 
worker can gain by finding a job with probability qq(q). U-E is the corresponding loss 
by a worker from losing his job with probability s. These two equations can be solved 
for E and U explicitly:   4 
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i di c,  with 0 < 
a < 1, on a continuum of goods ranging from zero to n, the (integral measure of) the 
number of firms.
iv It is well known that this specification of preferences leads to a 
constant elasticity of the inverse demand function, a-1, and to relative demand of 




The present-discounted value of a vacancy is V = [-g+q(q)(J-V)]/r . It consists of the 
hiring costs g and the net return of transferring the vacancy V into a job with value J 
expected with probability q(q).  r is the discount rate. As the value of the vacancy is 
zero in equilibrium, we get J = g/ q(q): the value of a job is equal to the vacant job 
costs g multiplied by the expected duration of the vacancy. When considering the 
firms’ hiring costs we must consider that the occupied job may be separated from the 
worker again with probability s. The current value of the expected value of a job 
therefore is (r + s)J = (r + s)g /q(q). These are labour costs that are added to the real 
wage received by the worker. Labour costs then equal w + (r + s)g /q(q). Pissarides 
(1990) links the above to the neo-classical production function.
v Here we link it to the 
model by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). If the temporary utility function is discounted and 






- . It is well 
known from endogenous growth theory or the theory of optimal growth that, in the 
absence of productivity growth, the value of consumption will be stationary and the 
interest rate will equal the discount rate r. This seems to be the shortest way to 
determine the interest rate. 
Technologies are defined by li = f + a xi , with a, f > 0. The left side represents 
demand for labour to produce good i, f is the fixed part and axi is the variable part of 
labour demand. As all goods are assumed to be identical in the utility function and in 
the production technology, their prices and quantities will be the same.
vi  
Total labour demand is nli =n( f + a xi). Equating this to the employment (1-
u)L yields (1-u)L= nli = n( f + a xi ). Solving the latter equation we find the rate of 
unemployment linked to the number of firms as: 
 
() L ax f n L L nl L u i i / )] ( [ / + - = - =      (2) 
 
Proposition 1: There is a partial negative relation between the rate of unemployment 
and the number of firms: The larger the number of firms, the lower the unemployment 
rate (ceteris paribus), or the lower the unemployment rate the more firms can be in 
the market.  
 
Profits of a firm, which are zero in equilibrium, are defined (dropping index i) in 
nominal terms as  
p(x)x-[W + p(r + s)g /q(q)]( f + a x)=0      (3)   5 
 
W is the nominal wage rate and real hiring costs are made nominal by multiplying 
their real value with the price. With the exception of Vogt (1996) all the other static 
monopolistic competition models mentioned above do not take hiring costs into 
account. The first-order condition of profit maximisation is:  
 
)] ( / ) ( [ q g a q s r p W a p + + =      (4) 
 
In the model by Pissarides (1990) the neo-classical way to get full 
employment with decreasing real wage costs is blocked by search frictions. In 
monopolistic competition models without hiring costs this road is absent anyway 
because real wages are fixed as in (4) (see Weitzman (1985), Blanchard and Kiyotaki 
(1987), Matusz (1996, 1998). The Dixit-Stiglitz road to full employment used to be 
entry whenever profits are positive, according to equation (2) with u=0. In Weitzman 
(1982) u>0 comes in exogenously via the assumption that firms expect aggregate 
demand to be (in symbols of our model) u
ewL, where all the three variables are given 
exogenously. With this expected demand, a self-fulfilling prophecy yields the 
unemployment rate u=u
e >0. In our model, however, the Dixit-Stiglitz road to full-
employment is present but limited by Pissarides’ search friction, resulting in an 
endogenous value of unemployment u > 0 incorporated in equation (2).  
 
Wages 
There are two sorts of rents in Pissarides’ model: on occupied jobs, indexed j, 
employed workers do not have to search and therefore have an income rent of Ej - U 
and firms do not have to incur hiring costs and therefore have a rent Jj-V. Bargaining 
these rents is assumed to determine real wages. This is done by choosing the real 
wage by maximising the function (Ej-U)
b(Jj-V)
1-b with b as the bargaining power of 
workers and 1-b that of firms, V=0, Ej=[wj – zu + sU]/(r+s), U according to the 
explicit solution given above, and Jj= {[p(x)x]/ ( f + a x)] -Wj}/[(r + s)p] which 
equals g /q(q) when setting profits in (3) equal to zero.
vii  E, U and V are as in 
Pissarides (1990). The value for J differs from Pissarides’ model because we have 
replaced the neoclassical production function by elements of the Dixit-Stiglitz model. 
The result of the maximisation with respect to the real wage in its general form is 
identical to that of Pissarides in that workers get a share b of the sum of the rents to be 
distributed: Ej-U = b(Ej-U + Jj-V). Insertion of the values for Ej, U, Jj and V yields the 
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Insertion of Ej-U = b(Jj-V)/(1-b) from the general form of the bargaining result and 
J=g/q(q) into rU = [z - zu + qq(q)(E-U)] yields rU = z - zu +qbg/(1-b). Insertion of 











+ - = qg b b
ax f
x
z wj ) 1 (     (5) 
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The last term indicates that workers participate in the hiring costs saved on occupied 
jobs compared to vacancies. The second but last term is net revenue or output per 
worker as in Pissarides (1990) - where the output-per-worker term is f(k) – (r+d)k -, 
but here without capital cost as in the Dixit-Stiglitz model. The unemployment tax, zu, 
has dropped out only in the very last step of the calculation yielding (5). This shows 
that the Pissarides approach is consistent with an explicit financing scheme for the 
unemployment benefit if both unemployed and employed workers have the same 
reduction of their gross payments w and z respectively. Then the difference of going 
from a status of unemployed to employed workers is unchanged and all incentives are 
exactly as in Pissarides‘ model.    
  This model is kept as simple as the basic workhorse models were. We resist 
the temptation to endogenize the bargaining power parameter, or distinguish between 
the love-of-variety and the price elasticity parameters, or endogenize the mark-up. 
These extensions can be taken on board when applications require to do so.    
 
3.  The Equilibrium Solution: Existence and uniqueness 
 
Equations (1)-(5) determine the five variables of the model when goods produced 
serve as numéraire (p=1): u, n, x, q and w. Insertion of wage plus hiring cost per 
worker from (4) into (3) allows to solve for the equilibrium quantity: 
 
 






x       ( 6 )  
 
Proposition 2: The equilibrium quantity of the model is independent of the labour 
market variables stemming from Pissarides’ part of the model (unemployment benefit 
z, hiring costs g, unemployment rate u, vacancies v, separation rate s, power 
parameter b). 
 
Clearly, this result is due to the fact that the firm part of the Dixit-Stiglitz model is 
merely changed by adding hiring costs to the wage rate: this term drops out when 
solving (3) and (4) for the quantity. Next, we replace real revenue or output per 














+ =       (5’) 
 
This equation essentially has the real wage as a function of the v/u=q ratio. This 
equation is drawn as the BB curve in the upper right quadrant of Figure 1.
x To solve 
the system the next steps serve to get a second equation of this type. Solving (2) for n 
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 This is a function n(q) or n(u). The n(u) function is drawn in the lower left quadrant 
of Figure 1. Dividing (4) by the price and solving for the real wage yields: 









- =        ( 4 ’ )  
 
Larger hiring costs (r+s)J imply lower wages according to (4’) as in Pissarides’ 
model when interest is given. Here the model resembles Pissarides’ because the zero-
profit condition in his model – rewritten in  footnote 5 above - implies constant labour 
costs as long as r = f’(k)-d and therefore k are constant. By implication wages w 
always move in the opposite direction of hiring costs, (r+s)g/q(q), in Pissarides’ 
model and in ours.  This clearly differs from monopolistic competition models 
without hiring costs where wage increases lead to higher prices under constant returns 
to scale (see Weitzman (1985), Blanchard and Kiyotaki 1987, equation (12’), Matusz 
(1996, 1998)). Vogt (1996) argues that this property of monopolistic competition 
models is undesirable for empirical reasons. He develops a potential competition 
model in which sunk costs deter entry of a potential Bertrand competitor in 
homogenous goods resulting in a demand curve with a kink at a limit price. This 
ensures that prices, quantity and employment are independent of cost increases within 
certain limits. Our combination of the models by Pissarides and Dixit-Stiglitz 
generates another, though less strict, separation of wages from prices because costs, 
price and employment are still interdependent. It is only that increasing real wages 
decrease hiring costs rather than increasing prices. Equation (4’) is drawn as a 
function w(q) in the upper right quadrant of figure 1, indicated as the MM curve. It is 
also drawn in the upper left quadrant of figure 1 with wages as a function of hiring 
costs. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 OVER HERE 
 
The intersection of lines BB and MM determines the wage and the tightness rate in 
the upper right quadrant, and hiring costs in the upper left quadrant. Given the rate of 
tightness thus determined, the solution for the rates of unemployment and vacancies 
can be found in the lower right quadrant. The rate of unemployment then determines 
the number of firms in the lower left quadrant. 
Equations (5’) and (4’) are two functions w(q). Replacing labour costs in (4) 






















z a      (7) 
 
The left side is marginal revenue and the right side is marginal cost. In figure 2 both 
functions are drawn. The left side is denoted as MR and the right side as MC in figure 
2. MC is increasing in q and may have a negative second derivative in q.
xi  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 OVER HERE 
 
The MC curve starts at az if q=0 and lim q®0 q= lim m(1/q, 1)= lim 
m(¥,1)=¥; otherwise it starts above az. As q goes to infinity the MC curve also goes 
to infinity. Thus, the MC curve either intersects once or not at all. Therefore we have 
a unique or no equilibrium.  
   8 
Proposition3: The existence of a unique equilibrium is guaranteed if az < a. 
This implies a positive equilibrium value for the tightness ratio v/u=q. The fixed cost 
parameter f and the size of the economy, L, have no impact on the value of v/u=q.  
 
If, however, az ³ a, the tightness ratio is zero, there are no vacancies and 
unemployment is 100% according to equation (2). With no output, z cannot be paid.  
Therefore this cannot be an equilibrium situation.   
 
4.  Comparative static analysis 
 
The following changes in the determinants of labour costs drive up the MC curve on 
the RHS of equation (7), but leave the MR curve and the equilibrium quantity x 
unchanged according to equation (6): db>0, dg>0, dr>0, dz>0, ds>0. This decreases 
the value of the tightness ratio in figure 2. The UV equation (1), drawn as u(q) in the 
lower right quadrant of figure 1, shifted to higher u in case of ds>0, then implies that 
the rate of unemployment goes up, and equation (2) in the lower left quadrant implies 
that the number of firms goes down. Note that the exogenous changes leave the 
equilibrium value of the labour cost unchanged according to (4’).  
From (4’) and (1’), which do not contain b and z, we can conclude that 
increased bargaining power and unemployment benefits lead to higher real wages and 
less vacancies because of the fall in the tightness ratio. In figure 1 this can be seen as 
only the BB curve shifts (for dz) or rotates (for db) upward but all other curves do not 
change their position.  
In the upper right quadrant of figure 1 increasing the rate of interest and the 
strength of shocks rotates the BB curve upward and the MM curve downward. The 
latter of the two effects on wages is stronger, because from (5), using (6) for x, which 
both do not contain r and s, we can conclude that increasing the rate of interest and 
the strength of shocks decrease wages because of the fall in the tightness ratio 
according to figure 2 and equation (7).
xii  
The impact of the change in hiring costs, dg>0, is to decrease tightness and 
vacancies, but its effect on wages depends on the change of the term gq in (5). 
Applying the implicit function rule to (7) and dividing by q and multiplying by g 
yields   
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The numerator and the denominator have identical terms up to -qqq/q.
 xiii This term is 
smaller than one
xiv. By implication the percentage decrease of q is larger in absolute 
terms than the increase of g, leading to a fall in wages according to (5). In terms of 
figure 1 this means that the upward rotation of BB is weaker than the downward 
rotation of MM.  
 
Proposition 4: With increases in worker’s bargaining power b, hiring costs g, the 
discount rate r and unemployment benefits z and the size of shocks s we confirm 
Pissarides’ results of decreasing tightness and increasing unemployment and falling 
wage rates. We add the result of a decreasing number of firms and increasing 
unemployment insurance premium both resulting from lower employment.   
   9 
In Weitzman (1982) the rate of unemployment is negatively related to real 
wages: if the (expected) rate of unemployment goes up real wages decrease, because 
lower expected demand moves the firm up its average cost curve. This is interpreted 
as a pro-cyclical movement of real wages. In our model a positive or a negative 
relation may exist depending on the reason that drives up wages: if the exogenous 
change in question increases (decreases) tightness the unemployment rate goes down 
(up). For example, an increase in the rate of interest or the separation rate, which 
decreases tightness and wages and increases unemployment, yields a negative relation 
as in Weitzman’s model. On the other hand, an increase in unemployment benefit z or 
bargaining power b increases wages, decreases the tightness ratio and increases 
unemployment. A similar negative relation w(u) can be found in Weinrich (1993) 
based on a linear transformation of a Cobb-Douglas effort function that generates 
constant effort. On this relation u is determined through the use of an equation similar 
to our equation (4’), which fixes the real wage in the absence of hiring costs (see 
Weinrich 1993, p.545). Moving the latter equation along the former would result in a 
negative relation between w and u. Specific combinations of parameter shifts could 
also generate a positive relation between w and u in the comparative static manner.       
Concerning an increase in worker bargaining power Dutt and Sen (1997) find 
a different result in a demand-constrained model of monopolistic competition cum 
unemployment of the Weitzman (1985) type. In their model bargaining power raises 
wage rates. As workers save less than profit earners, demand is increased and so is 
employment. The authors show that the result can neither be proven nor rejected if a 
decreasing marginal product of labour exists.  
Changes in fixed costs, df <0, which is one of two possible versions of 
exogenous productivity increases, do not change the tightness ratio and therefore the 
unemployment and vacancy rates and labour costs are unchanged.
xv Firm size x is 
decreased and the number of firms is increased as in Dixit-Stiglitz. Aggregate output, 
nx, is unaffected. This can be seen from equations (2’) and (6). 
  A decrease in marginal costs via da<0, decreases the slope and intercept of the 
MC curve in figure 2 and shifts up the MM curve in figure 1. The result is a larger 
value for the tightness ratio, v/u=q. This reduces the unemployment rate and increases 
the rate of vacancies according to equation (1) and (1’). The size and number of firms 
are both increased according to equation (6) and (2’). Wages are increased according 
to equation (5’).  
 
Proposition 5: (i) Productivity increases in the fixed cost parameter, df<0, when we 
leave labour market variables unchanged, decrease the size of firms while increasing 
the number of firms as in the Dixit-Stiglitz model. Aggregate output, however, is 
unchanged. (ii) Pissarides’ productivity results appear in our model and are caused 
by a decrease in the variable labour demand parameter, da<0. Employment, 
tightness, the number and size of firms increase, and so do wages and aggregate 
output.  
 
An increase in love-of-variety, da<0, which means that the elasticity of substitution is 
getting smaller in absolute terms and competition is decreased, shifts down the MR 
curve in figure 2 and the MM curve in figure 1. The tightness ratio falls, the 
unemployment rate goes up and the number of vacancies goes down.
xvi Wages fall 
according to (5’). Firm size falls according to (6). The effect on the number of firms is 
ambiguous because the effect via the size of the firm is increasing the number of firms   10 
whereas the effect via the rate of unemployment is decreasing the number of firms as 
the horizontal intercept of the curve in the lower left quadrant moves outward.  
 
Proposition 6: A preference induced decrease in substitution and competition 
decreases firm size as in the Dixit-Stiglitz model, increases unemployment and 
decreases the tightness ratio and wages. Unlike the Dixit-Stiglitz model, the effect on 
the number of firms is ambiguous. 
 
A transition from monopolistic to perfect competition can be made by setting fixed 
costs f=0 and removing product differentiation setting a=1. This increases the 
tightness ratio and vacancies and decreases unemployment. By implication 
unemployment is lower under perfect competition than under monopolistic 
competition.
xvii In Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) this result is achieved by an 
aggregate demand externality based on real balances in the utility function and 
endogenous labour supply.  
 
Integrating two identical economies doubles L. This leaves the tightness ratio, the 
rates of unemployment and vacancies unchanged. The number of firms and varieties 
is doubled as in the Dixit-Stiglitz model and so are the number of unemployed 
workers and vacant jobs, uL and vL.  
 
Proposition 7: Doubling the size of the market doubles the number of firms, the 
number of unemployed people and the number of vacant jobs, but leaves the rate of 
unemployment unchanged. Doubling the number of varieties is a gain from trade and 
integration.  
 
Matusz  (1996 and 1998) finds that the rate of unemployment does change through 
market size effects of international trade:  He combines the Dixit-Stiglitz model with 
an efficiency wage model using a non-shirking constraint to find the result. Matusz 
(1996) uses the same set up for differentiated intermediates. In his models an increase 
in market size increases either the productivity of the final output or the variety of 
consumer goods allowing for a relaxation of the efficiency-wage constraint and a 
reduction of the rate of unemployment. This result may vanish when there is no non-
shirking constraint as in our model. Two other channels - discussed verbally by 
Matusz (1996) – which might in principal affect the rate of unemployment, are also 
absent here. First, the price elasticity of demand in his model as in ours is independent 
of the number of firms. If it were dependent on the number of firms as it is in models 
with strategic interaction, entry induced by larger market size might affect firms’ size 
and decrease average cost, which might be (similar to) a productivity effect. However, 
it needs a proof to see the interaction of market size, firms’ size, productivity and 
unemployment. Second, if there were an impact of more variety on the search 
intensity, the rate of unemployment might be affected. In our set up following 
Pissarides (1990) this effect is absent because the bargaining is on income and not on 
utility and the utility function and the Nash-product are specified independently of 
each other. I agree with Matusz that it is an empirical question whether or not these 
channels matter quantitatively.         
All changes in parameters inducing the above comparative static results have 
to be interpreted as stemming from perfectly non-anticipated shocks that are expected 
to be permanent with probability one because the Pissarides part of the model uses   11 
steady-state present values. However, Bean and Pissarides (1993) show that it can be 
adjusted for use on short-run issues as well.  
The economic mechanism (in the sense of finding the solution of the model) 
of the comparative-static changes as summarised in Figure 1 always goes from the 
exogenous change to its impact on real wages, hiring costs and the tightness ratio and 
from there to the rate of unemployment and the number of firms.  
This mechanism implies that aggregate output is affected via the number of 
firms and not via firm size - unless variable cost parameters or the love-of-variety 
parameter is changed. Changes in the fixed cost parameter have no impact on 
aggregate output as can be seen from multiplying the solutions for n and x according 
to equation (6) and (2’) respectively. Aggregate output being mainly affected via the 
number of firms is in line with the zero-profit condition and the endogenous number 
of firms and variants.
xviii  
The results of this section are summarized in Tables 2 and 3. 
 
Table 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The first four columns of table 2 clearly show that Pissarides’ results carry over to our 
model. The fifth column adds results concerning the number of firms added by this 
model. The sixth column indicates that firm size is independent of labour market 
parameters in this model.
xix  Finally, the unemployment insurance premium has the 
same sign as the unemployment rate.  
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The columns 5-7 of table 3 are exactly the same as in Dixit-Stiglitz. The first three 
columns summarize the effects of goods market parameters from the Dixit-Stiglitz 
model on the labour market variables – these are new results. The column concerning 
the number of firms has different results from Dixit-Stiglitz concerning marginal costs 
and marginal revenue because the impact via the unemployment rate changes their 
results as explained in detail above. The last column adds results from the 
unemployment insurance premium t, which again follows those of the unemployment 
rate u.     
  
5.  Summary and conclusion 
 
Linking Pissarides’ (1990) search theory of unemployment to the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) 
model rather than to the neo-classical production function yields five groups of 
results. First, the rate of unemployment is linked to the number of firms. Every 
variable that has an impact on the rate of unemployment also has an impact on the 
number of firms. Thus, aggregate output is affected via the number firms and not the 
size of firms unless variable cost and love-of-variety parameters are changed.  
Second, the introduction of love-of-variety preferences has an impact as well. 
A decrease in the love-of-YDULHW\SDUDPHWHU.GHFUHDVHVWKHHODVWLFLW\RIVubstitution 
and competition, decreases marginal revenue and the tightness ratio, increases 
unemployment, decreases vacancies and wages and - deviating from the Dixit-Stiglitz 
model - has an ambiguous effect on the number of firms. It also decreases the size of 
the firms. By implication employment is higher under perfect than under monopolistic 
competition.   12 
Third, other comparative static results of Pissarides’ model and the model of 
Dixit and Stiglitz survive. This latter result is mainly due to the fact that hiring costs 
are added to real wages and therefore the equilibrium quantity is independent of 
labour market variables. This is similar to the independence of the capital-labour ratio 
in Pissarides’ model from labour market variables. By implication the introduction of 
hiring costs in both cases decreases wages received by workers. 
Four, unlike earlier monopolistic competition models real wages have some 
flexibility because of the hiring costs depending on the rate of tightness. The model 
allows for a negative or a positive relation between real wages and the rate of 
unemployment. The negative relation occurs provided the shocks come from interest 
and separation rates, the CES parameter or the marginal cost parameter. The positive 
relation occurs when there is variation in bargaining power and benefits.       
Finally, the fixed cost parameter has no impact on the solution for the 
tightness ratio and other labour market variables and influences only the size and 
number of firms, but not aggregate output. Doubling market size doubles the number 
of firms, and the number but not the rate of unemployed workers and vacant jobs. It 
increases the gains from trade only via variety. 
  The Pissarides-Dixit-Stiglitz model of this paper has the desirable properties 
of both its underlying models, and also some which have been stated as desirable in 
macroeconomics. The combination of the basic models yields some new results as 
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Table 1  Theories of unemployment and imperfect competition. 
 




Pessimistic expectations  Weitzman 1985  Weitzman 1982 
    Dutt/Sen  1997 
 
Effort  function    Weinrich  1993    
  
Shapiro-Stiglitz    Matusz 1996, 1998 
 
Dual labour market    de Groot and v.Schaik 
(1998, 2000), de Groot 
 (2001) 
 
Union  bargaining      Bräuninger  (2000) 
 
Search  models    This  paper   Aghion/Howitt  1998 
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Table 2  Comparative static results of labour market parameters  
 
Effect on :  WLJKWQHVV  unempl. u.  vac. v wage w firms n size x premium t 
from increases of ; 
 
%DUJDLQLQJSRZHU  - +    - +  - 0 + 
  
+LULQJFRVWV   -  +   -  -  -  0  + 
 
Interest rate r    -  +    -  -  -  0  + 
 
Benefit z    -  +    -  +  -  0  + 
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Table 3 Comparative static results of goods market parameters 
 
Effect on :WLJKWQHVVXQHPSOXYDFYILUPVQZDJHZVL]H[RXWSQ[SUHPW 
from increases of ; 
 
Fixed costs f    0  0  0  -  0  +  0  0 
 
Marginal  costs  a  - +  - - - - - + 
 
0DUJLQDOUHYHQXH.  + -  + ? + + + - 
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List of symbols 
 
.  marginal revenue, CES parameter  
a   marginal costs   
  bargaining power  
  hiring costs 
f   fixed costs     
L   country size   
n  number of firms  
nx  aggregate output  
r   interest rate     
s   separation rate 
t  unemployment insurance premium or tax  
  tightness ratio v/u  
u  unemployment rate.   
v   vacancy rate  
w   wage   
x   firm size 
y   utility  
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Figure 2. Marginal revenue, MR at value a, is equal to 
marginal cost, MC. The intersection of both lines determines 
the tightness ratio q.  
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Figure 1. The wage bargaining result, BB, and the profit maximising real wage, MM, determine the real wage 
and the tightness ratio in the upper right quadrant. This implies a solution for the unemployment rate u and 
vacancies v in the lower right quadrant. The unemployment rate u determines how many firms can be in the 
market, in the lower left quadrant. Each result for wages implies a result for hiring costs in the upper left 
quadrant.    20 
 
                                                            
i See below 
ii Subsections are titled as in Pissarides 1990. The search part is explained in greater detail there. 
iii Pissarides (1998, p.167, footnote 15) refers to estimates of the matching function using a Cob-
Douglas functional form, which justifies the assumptions made in the text. 
iv By implication we only consider the case of a large number of firms in which no strategic behaviour 
takes place. 
v In Pissarides (1990) this leads to the zero-profit condition f(k) - (r+d)k  - w – (r + s)g/ q(q) = 0. Here 
f(k) is the output per unit of labour and d is the rate of depreciation.  
 
vi Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984, p.435, fn. 5) also follow this procedure.  
vii As in Pissarides (1990, equation 1.14) this is profits gross of expected hiring costs.  
viii This result corresponds to equation 1.18 in Pissarides 1990. Note that with b=1, the negotiation 
result would require V=J=g/q=g/(m/v)=0, which could only hold for v=0 without additional 
assumptions on the matching function. However, with v=0 we also have q=0 and therefore no 
vacancies and hiring costs. Equation (5) would imply that wages equal revenue per worker. 
ix This result corresponds to equation 1.19 in Pissarides 1990.  
x The equation follows from this model but can also be derived from equations 1.20b and c in 
Pissarides (1990). 
xi To get a negative second derivative of the MC curve it is sufficient to assume that the matching 
function is of the Cobb-Douglas type. 
xii The impact on vacancies remains unclear here. Pissarides’ result is achieved if the direct effect of an 
increase of s dominates.  
xiii It is the formal analogue to the share of capital for a neo-classical production function f(k). 
xiv Using the properties of the matching function presented on the first page and Euler’s theorem we 
















xv Effects of changes in fixed costs may be quite different in endogenous growth models. See de Groot 
(2000)  
xvi This result can also be found in the quality ladders literature (see Boone 2000, Aghion and Howitt 
1998). 
xvii The number and size of firms then become indeterminate according to equations (2’) and (6), 
whereas aggregate output becomes nx = (1-u)L/a. 
xviii As capital is absent in this simple model there is no role for capacity utilisation in the change of 
aggregate output. In more complex models these relation are likely to be less simplistic.  
xix Under the assumption of efficiency wages this may be different. It is different in de Groot and van 
Schaik (1998), but not in Matusz (1996, 1998). This depends on the details of their modeling of 
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